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MONOTHEISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
Jan Assmann
I The ‘Mosaic Distinction’ and the Problem of Violence
Monotheism introduced a new distinction into the realm of religion, 
bringing about a totally new form of religion whose hallmark was 
less the exclusive worship of one god, but the distinction as such. 
This distinction nnplies a whole scale of concretizations between the 
poles of a more ontological and cognitive meaning with regard to 
true and falsc, and of a more ethical and deontic mcaning witii 
regard to ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ or just and unjust, or iieedom and 
‘slavery.’ Drawing the distinction entails making a decision, and this 
decision of necessity lmplies rejecting the discarded option. Tlus new 
form of rehgion is based on a dccision, which m lts turn is based 
on a deep conviction, implying strong notions of what is deemed 
incompatible. All convictions aspiring to any depth and power require 
those strong conccpts of the excludcd other. The monotheistic, oi 
‘Mosaic’ distinction, which in its last consequence means the dis- 
tinction between ‘God and the world, is hard to draw, and the 
Bible is very exphcit about thcse many difficulties and drawbacks. 
Monotheism requircd a firm dccision and correspondingly strong 
concepts about ‘the other,’ for which a whole new vocabulary was 
created: the ‘heathens,’ ‘pagans,’ ‘gentiles,’ ‘unbelievers,’ ‘idolaters,’ 
‘hcretics’ etc. Thc strength of the decision and the firmness of the 
conviction imply an element of violence. This element of violence 
becomes obvious as soon as the distinction betwc en true and false 
or good and evil is turncd into the distinction between friend and 
‘foe.’ I do not hold that this new form of religion brought violence 
into the world; the world, of course, was already full of violence 
before the advcnt of monotheism. One could even argue that monothe- 
ism, by abolishing ethnic and national distinctions and creating over- 
arching identities and solidarities, tends to make the world more 
peaceful. But it is impossible to deny that at least potentially this
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kind of religion implies a new type of violence, religiously motivated 
and directed against those who, in the light of that new distinction, 
appear to be the enemies of god.
‘Enemies of God,’ however, sounds familiar not only in the con- 
text of monotheism, but also in the context of ‘pagan’ religion. It is 
a normal device in ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian sources to 
represent the political enemy as an enemy of God. In order to get 
a clearer view of the problematic alliance between religion and vio- 
lence, we must distinguish between ‘interpretation’ and ‘motivation.’ 
The religious interpretation or legitimation of violcnce is as old as 
warfare in gcneral. Examples stretch from the Ancient Near East to 
the most recent military activities in East and West. What is new, 
is the religious motivation of violence—the idea of killing a person 
or starting a war for the sake of God, to fulhll his will and ordcrs, 
acting as God’s executioners.
This new type of religion is based on a truth—or a ‘law’—that 
requires the resolution either to kill or to die for it, a new form of 
‘religious heroism,’ which implies either active or passive intolerance. 
On what could be called the ‘mythical’ plane, the plane of the found- 
ing stories and grand narratives modeling the lives of peoples and 
individuals, active intolerance is exercised, e.g., by Moses after the 
episode of the Golden Calf, when 3000 men “brothers, friends, neigh- 
bors” were killed; by Pinhas, who killed his kinsman Zimri together 
with a Midianite girl in the act of love-making;2 by Joshua and the 
whole complex of the “conquest”; by Elijah killing the priests of 
Ba’al after winning the contest,3 etc. The list is much longer, and 
though these events belong to myth and not to history, it seems to 
me highly significant that the new religion attaches so much impor- 
tance to violence in its narrative self-presentation. Violence belongs 
to what could be called the ‘core-semantics’ of monotheism. I do 
not state that monotheism is violent; merely that it dwells on scenes 
of violence in narrating its path to general realization.
On the plane of history, active intolerance was shown by Josiah 
destroying the “high places” (bamot) and killing the priests;4 by Ezra 
divorcing the mixed marriages;5 and above all by Judas Maccabaeus,
2 Num 25:7.
3 1 Kg 18:40.
4 2 Kg 23.
5 Ezra 9: 1-4.
who applied the fictitious and archaic Deuteronomist regulations con- 
cerning the Canaanite towns, which “must not be spared”6 to the 
Jewish towns and communities that abandoned the way of the Law 
and succumbed to Hellenism. To those towns, “the ban was exe- 
cuted” and every living being was killed.7 In I Maccabees, the story 
is told with pride, not with horror. The biblical term for active intol- 
erance is qana, “zeal.” God is a “zealous god” (El qana), persecuting 
the idolatry of the fathers down to the third and fourth generations, 
and those who love him are expected to be equally zealous in fighting 
for the Law. Monotheism requires a zealous attitude; it is a virtue 
to be zealous, i.e. to engage totally in the cause of God. The Arabic 
equivalent, of course, is djihad. The Maccabaean wars seem to be 
the first religiously motivated wars in history. They were wars of resis- 
tance, to be sure, led in defense against an aggressor and his pro- 
ject of forced assimilation.
Judging from numerous discussions, modern theologians—Jews and 
Christians, Catholics and Protestants—hate to be reminded of these 
biblical stories and react violently to this line of reasoning, which 
they decry as “anti-Semitic.” They point to the unhistorical, purely 
fictional character of these texts, as if this would solve the problem. 
It is precisely the fictional or rather mythical character of most of 
these stories which makes them potentially dangerous. I am not talk- 
ing about ‘history,’ but about cultural semantics conditioning and 
motivating the actions and attitudes of peoples living in the horizon 
of these semantics. I consider it dangerous to close one’s eyes vis-a-vis 
the potentially negative or malignant implications of one’s convic- 
tions. In a global world we cannot afford such an apologetic atti- 
tude. Stark denial is not helpful; reflection is requircd. I do not want 
just to criticize or reproach monotheism’s violent implications, but 
to encourage a process of reflection and, if possible, what in Freudian 
terms is called “sublimation.” I do not advocate abolishing the Mosaic 
distinction, but rather call for more reflective, considerate and his- 
torically informed ways of dealing with it.
Active intolcrance, however, is only onc sidc of what I have called 
‘religious heroism.’ The other side is passive intolerance, i.e. mar- 
tyrdom, in Hebrew qiddush ha-shem. On the plane of myth, this form
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of qana—“zeal for the Lord”—appears in the Book of Daniel,8 which 
was written in the time of the Maccabaean Wars; on the plane of 
history, it appears during these same wars in the form of heroic 
resistance to Antiochus IV Epiphanes’ project to turn his kingdom 
into the first ‘nation-state’ in human history, a state where there 
should be only one people, one religion and (what was regarded to 
be the same) one law.'1 Many Jews resisted this forced assimilation 
and preferred to die rather than bow to an idol or eat sacrificial 
meat, becoming by this form of zealous engagement for the Law the 
first martyrs in history. Also in this context, it has to be stressed that 
there are many examples of heroism and of ‘dying for’ outside the 
horizon of monotheism. Roman history especially is full of examples 
of heroic Romans who preferred death to ignominy, slavery or other 
privations they considered incompatible with their convictions about 
‘Romanhood,’ honor, patriotism, ancl bravery. Martyrdom, however, 
i.e. to die for God, was something new, and it was based on this 
same distinction between true and false or good and evil, which is 
the hallmark of the new religion. Drawing the distinction, forming 
the decision, rejecting the excluded option to the point of dying 
rather than giving in and compromising: this is the line that leads 
from a new form of religious conviction to its personal, social and 
political consequences.
Both, active and passive intolerance, are interpreted and justified 
in the Bible as a kind of ‘fulfillment’: the fulfillment of scripture. 
This idea of ‘scripture’ is equally novel and innovative. Two kinds 
of written texts may be identified, which I propose to term ‘infor- 
mative’ and ‘performative.’ Informative texts require our attention; 
performative texts, our obedience—i.e. fulfillment, execution, or trans- 
lation into action and behavior. Informative texts tell us something 
important or amusing about the world; performative texts order and 
prohibit, and in doing so make claims of our life. Holy writ is a 
performative text: it requires that it be performed or fulfilled in our 
way of living. This hold true for, at least, the Jewish or, to be more 
precise, the ‘halakhic’ concept of scripture, which, however, is also 
present in various forms in the other monotheistic religions. All 
monotheistic religions, even Buddhism (which, though not monothe- 
istic, is still a religion based on a variant of the Mosaic distinction),
" Ch. 3, ch. 14.
9 1 Macc 1:41-64.
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imply performative scripture in the form of canons of holy writ, 
determining the forms of personal, social and political action and 
behavior in the way a film script determines the actions and speeches 
of the actors. Martyrdom is the form of acting out a performative 
text in which this relation between scripture and fulfillment becomes 
most clear. The Jewish martyrs typically die with a verse of scrip- 
ture on their lips. Death is the most radical and the most decisive 
way of fulfilling, acting out, or living out scripture; not in the tem- 
ple, the sanctuary or some other sacred place, but in everyday life 
and in the most profane and unholy situations and places.111
Again we must realize that the world was already full of scripts, 
performative texts prescribing human action and claiming strict obe- 
dience and fulfillment, well before the emergence of monotheism. 
These texts, however, never claimed to regulate the whole of human 
life, but only certain spheres of action, as may be regulated either 
by law codes and royal edicts or by rituals and ceremonial pre- 
scriptions. The Torah, it is true, contains many similar laws and 
prescriptions, and there are many singular parallels in other ancient 
civilizations, but there is no parallel for the claim the Torah holds 
on the totality of human existence, nor for the divine origin and 
timeless, absolute validity of such an all-encompassing regulation. 
Without this form of pcrformative scripture, the underlying distinc- 
tion, decision and conviction cannot be maintaincd and reproduced 
through the sequence of generations and radical changes of context 
and circumstances history brings about in the course of centuries. 
The Mosaic distinction requires and brings about a thorough restruc- 
turing of cultural memory. This form of living in the horizon of a 
canon is not exclusively Jewish; in various permutations, it applies 
to many minoritarian communities in antiquity. They left the main- 
stream ways of life in favor of alternative, purer paths, typically based 
and gathered around a core-library of normative and ‘performative’ 
scripture: the Pythagoraeans, the Orphics, the Platonists and other 
philosophical schools, the ‘sectarian movements’ in early Judaism, 
the various branches of Gnosticism and Hermeticism, the Christians, 
the Buddhists, the Manichaeans, the Mandeans and others. In all 
these movemcnts, we meet with the desire for the sanctification of 
life, for living a life in fulfillment of a sacred or sanctioned script, a 
life in truth and goodness. 10
10 See Agus (1988).
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Drawing the distinction and making the decision requires a firm 
mind and heart. Monotheism implies not only a new idea of god 
but also, and above all, a new concept of man, laying mucli stress 
especially on ‘inner man’ (ho endos anthropos in the words of St. Paul, 
interior homo in those of Augustine). Israel is required not only to rec- 
ognize god’s unity (aechad), but love the Lord “witli all thy soul, all 
thy heart, all thy power”.11 The development of new forms of inner 
life, of subjectivity, reflectivity and inner conflicts, is among the most 
important personal consequences of monotheism. Conversion and 
repentance are perhaps the most promincnt and the most innova- 
tive of these new forms of inner life. Also in this respect, I would 
dare the thesis that conversion and repentance are unthinkable con- 
cepts in the context of traditional ‘pagan’ religions. These religions 
could not be separated from culture and society. You could assim- 
ilate to Egyptian or Mesopotamian culture, but never ‘convert’ to 
the respective religions. Conversion implies a decision based on the 
Mosaic distinction between true (or good, or just) and false (or bad, 
or unjust) religion. Conversion means making a decision about the 
true forms of life and belief. Repentance—teschuvah in Hebrew, metanoia 
in Greek—means a total transformation or reformation of one’s ways 
of living. It is closely connected to a concept of sin which is equally 
revolutionary. Making mistakes and repenting of them afterwards is, 
of course, a universal phenomenon. I am thinking of an existential 
turn, caused by an awareness of the general sinfulness of one’s former 
life. I am not speaking of specific misdeeds, but of the funda- 
mental and existential sinfulness of the ‘natural state,’ i.e. a life out- 
side the Law, unheeding the will of God, as it is expressed, e.g. in 
Ps 51 v. 7:
for I am born in guilt,
in sin my mother has conceived me.
and in verse 19:
Das Opfer, das Gott gefallt, ist ein zerknirschter Geist, ein zerbrochenes
und zerschlagenes Herz wirst Du, Gott, nicht verschmahen.
The god of monotheism has no divine partners, his partner is man; 
both in the shape of the chosen people, Israel, and that of the indi-
" See the ‘schema prayer’, Dtn 6.5.
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vidual Israelite, who assumed, in this new kind of religion, a totally 
new dignity. The individual now found himself or herself confronted 
with god, even exposed and surrendered to god’s omniscience and 
critical attention. Monotheism is a drama between god and man, 
acted out on the arena of, both, everyday life and of the inner life 
of the psyche. The T of the psalms stands firstly for a singular 
suffering or jubilating, imploring or thanksgiving individual, secondly 
for everybody confronting his god in similar situations, and thirdly 
for the community of Israel. It is an ‘I’ ‘larger-than-lifc,’ accommodat- 
ing all three meanings in its exposed position before God. Monotheism 
means an extension of the traditional world in the direction of tran- 
scendence and subjectivity, or outer and inner transcendence.
This new form of intensified subjectivity finds its clearest expres- 
sions in the sentiment of repentance and the step of conversion, to 
leave one’s former life which one has come to recognize as wrong, 
sinful or evil, and to enter the life of truth, the way of the Law or 
the imitation of Christ. All this is totally alien to ‘pagan’ religions. 
Repentance and conversions are dramatic plays acted out on the 
inner stage of the human heart, which co-evolved with the monothe- 
istic turn in ancient Israel. II
II The Politigal Consequences of Monotheism
The ‘monotheistic turn’ mcans both a revolution and an evolution, 
strctching over many centuries and including many drawbacks and 
movements in the oppositc direction. The law of evolution reads 
“Natura non facit saltus,” and it applies also to cultural history. But 
culture does make leaps, not perhaps in actual history, but in his- 
tory as it is perccived, remcmbcred and representcd. The monothe- 
istic turn is represented in thc Bible as a revolutionary ‘leap’ of the 
highest possible dcgrce. The prolonged sojourn of Israel in Egypt 
for more than four centuries effaces every memory of thc patriar- 
chal past in Canaan, and the cxodus from Egypt cuts the links to 
thc host culture and helps to prepare a ‘tabula rasa for God on 
which to write His revelation. Moses means a new beginning and 
the installation of a new religion, turning an amorphous mass of 
nameless emigrants into the ‘Chosen People,’ the people of God. 
The revelation of thc Law at Mt. Sinai constitutes the ‘primal scene’ 
of monotheism.
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This primal scene is politically determined in such a way as to 
suggest that monotheism is originally a political religion, in the sense 
of a sacralized political movement. I am envisaging, to be sure, the 
event at Mt. Sinai in its broader context, including the exodus from 
Egypt, the wanderings through the wilderness and the conquest of 
the Promised Land, and I am interpreting this narrative complex 
not in the sense of real history, but of mnemo-history. This means 
that I am asking for the form in which monotheism remembers and 
tells the story of its origins. I'lie primarily political character of this 
story is obvious. The story is about liberation from Egyptian serf- 
dom, a purely political action, in clear opposition to a kind of polit- 
ical order and organization, for which Egypt stands as its symbolical 
exponent. This political action leads to the constitution of the Hebrews 
as the people of God and a “kingdom of priests and a holy people”
(mamlekhet kohanim we-goj qadosh),12 an alternative political organization 
and the political antithesis to the oriental empires, based on the prin- 
ciple of sacral kingship or ‘representative theocracy.’ The form of 
this constitution is a treaty, a political alliance between the people 
and God.
Monotheism is the basic principle and the first commandment of 
this new political order: “I am YHVVH thy God that has liberated 
thee from Egypt. Thou shalt not have other gods beside me.” This 
does not mean that there are no other gods, but that Israel should 
not have other gods. This makes a big difference. Israel is committed 
to political loyalty, to staying loyal to the alliance and not breaking 
away to other overlords. Loyalty is a meaningful concept only if 
there are other gods. Exclusivism, the hallmark of monotheism, is 
therefore originally a political concept, meaning the exclusivity of 
allegiance to one particular god, not the exclusive existence of one 
god only. It concerns the alliance between the people of god and 
the god of liberation. To the loyalty of Israel corresponds the ‘jeal- 
ousy’ of God: both are political properties. Both, loyalty and jeal- 
ousy, are political concepts. Only with the transformation of a 
sacralized political movement into a new form of full-fledged reli- 
gion, the exclusivity of God turns from a question of commitment 
into a question of existence.
The Schema prayer, it is true, being a central part of the Sinai 
revelation, states that YHVVH is ‘ONE,’ aechad. This may be inter-
12 Ex 19:6.
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preted both ways: in the sense of an exclusivity of commitment, 
which befits the following injunction to love YHWH “with all thy 
heart, all thy soul and all thy might,” but also in the sense of absolute 
oneness or unity. In this context, the other gods that Israel is requested 
not to ‘have’ are not only forbidden, but nonexistent, false, fictive 
gods. Monolatry turns into Monotheism. YHWH is the only true 
god. The tension between monolatry and monotheism, loyalty to the 
one in full recognition of the existence of other gods on the one 
hand, and the recognition of only one god denying the existence of 
other gods as mere idols on the other hand, this tension marks bib- 
lical religion from the beginning. The borderline between the one 
god YHWH and the other gods is originally a political boundary, 
separating the Chosen People from the rest of the nations, but it 
tends right from the start to take on the cognitive or ‘existential’ 
meaning between true and false gods.
This border, the distinction between true and false or good and 
evil with regard to religion is the proper innovation of monotheism. 
This distinction simply did not exist previously in the realm of reli- 
gion. There were foreign religions with foreign, unknown gods, but 
nobody would have declared these gods false and fictitious or wrong 
and evil. Not the oneness of god, but the concept of ‘idols’ is the 
real monotheistic innovation. There were no idols and heathen in 
the realm of tribal religion and polytheism. The construction of 
paganism is the single achievement of monotheism, based on the dis- 
tinction between true and false.
Monotheism, therefore, is a religion that blurs boundaries, the 
boundaries that are expressed or represented by the divinities of poly- 
theism: between cities and countries, tribes and nations, day and night, 
land and sea, love and war, good and evil—but that also erects a 
boundary: betwcen true and false, religion and idolatry. Monotheism 
is, at the same time, exclusive and universalistic. Both tendencies, 
the exclusive and the universalistic, have political consequences.
The political problcm of universalism consists in its lack of legit- 
imizing function. The chief gods of polytheistic religions are state 
gods and reprcsent political unity. Ashur stands for Assyria, Marduk 
for Babylonia, Amun-Re for Egypt, Athena for Athens etc. In this 
way, YHWH originally stood for Israel but the biblical god soon 
outgrew this political role. Pure monotheism does not recognize 
national gods. This problem is solved by the monotheistic religions 
in different ways. The Jewish solution consists in ‘sub-sovereignty.’
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Israel develops the pure form of monotheism only under minority 
conditions, in the Babylonian exile and under Persian rule. Under 
these conditions, YHWH may renounce his political function as a 
state god and become truly universal. The Christian and Islamic 
solution of this problem is the empire. So little monotheism suits the 
needs of a national religion, so well it functions as an imperial reli- 
gion. It does not support a nation-state, but an empire. Christianity 
is linked to the Roman Empire, Islam forms empires of its own, 
from the Abassid, Omayyad, Fatimid etc. up to the Ottoman empires.
Nineteenth and twentieth century nationalism, therefore, repre- 
sented a mortal danger to the alliance between religion and politics, 
in the Muslim East as well as the Christian Wcst. The typical nation- 
state is a secular state. This holds for post-revolutionary France, as 
well as for Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and even early Zionism. 
Nationalism is also a political religion that does not tolerate other 
religions beside itself. Religious nation-states such as Pakistan and 
Iran are exceptional and problematic constructions. The same would 
apply to a not yet existing ‘Serbia’ (at least not under this designa- 
tion), with its national branch of Greek orthodox faith. The politi- 
cal forms that are congenial to monotheistic universalism are either 
minority conditions or imperial multinationalism.
But there is also the political problem of the ‘Mosaic distinction’ 
with its construction and exclusion of paganism. The political con- 
sequences of this distinction turn dangerous only if it is interpreted 
in terms of friend and foe. Then, the idolaters turn into enemies of 
God and the political leaders turn into God’s willing executioners. 
This interpretation seems typical of the political world view of the 
two extreme spearheads, of radical Islamism and the Bush adminis- 
tration. One side speaks of Allah’s enemies, the other of the axis of 
evil. Each side perceives the other as the providential foe, the 
“personihcation of its own question” (“ihre eigene Frage als Gestalt”):
Der Feind ist unsre Frage als Gestalt,
und er wird uns, wir ihn zum selben Ende hetzen.
The foe personifies our own question
and he will hunt us, we him, down to the same end.
Whereas Carl Schmitt saw in these verses by Theodor Daubler the 
epitome of the political, I would understand them as expressing a 
pathology of politics, a malign clinch calling for therapy. The polar- 
lzation of the political world into friend and foe seems in itself patho-
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logical, but it becomes mortally dangerous if the foe is demonized 
far beyond his real possibilities and intentions for destruction. In 
those cases the point is reached where politics merges with myth 
and religion.
III Monotheism, Violence and the Modern Situation
Twenty years ago, the global situation was still determined by the 
Cold War, i.e. the confrontation between two powers, one of which, 
the communist block, considered itself as atheistic, and the other, 
the capitalist block, as Christian. It appears that religion was only 
involved on the one side of this confrontation, the capitalist side. The 
opposite, in fact, is true. The communist totalitarianism of the Soviet 
empirc presented the paradigmatic case of a political rcligion, i.e. 
politics with a religious, even messianic perspective aiming at estab- 
lishing a paradise on earth in form of class-free society and eternal 
peace. Communism was not connected to a religion, but was in itself a 
rcligion. Using Shmuel N. Eisenstadt’s important distinction, we may 
say that it is deeply rooted in, but not caased by, Christian and Jewish 
millennialism. There is certainly no evolutionary trend leading from 
Christian or Jewish religion, or even Gnosdcism, to Marxism; still, 
thcse religions laid the foundation for a new religion, or anti-reli- 
gion, to arise. Being an universal or ‘world-religion’ in itself, it did 
not tolerate another religion beside itself. Soviet Communism was a 
rcligion and even what I call a “secondary or counter-religion,”11 
including a church and an orthodoxy, because it was based on the 
distinction bctween true and false and had codified this distinction 
in a canon of holy writ, including the works of Marx and Engels, 
Lenin, Stalin and Mao. It demanded bclief and propagated the polar- 
ization of bclievers and pagans, capitalism thcreby playing the role 
of paganism.13 4
Capitalism, on the other hand, is not a religion, in the same way 
as paganism is not a religion, but just a polemical and external 
classification. As a religion, communism had no real counterpart in 
the West. The exact counterpart was only represented by Islam. If
13 Assmann (1997).
14 Gellner (1994: 170- 181).
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towards the heathen, Christianity is a globalizing and polarizing, i.e. 
politicizing, religion.
Yet even Judaism implies a globalizing tendency. It is not mis- 
sionary, but lives among the peoples. What mission is to Christianity, 
diaspora is to Judaism. Judaism, originally a religion of self-exclu- 
sion from the orbit of other peoples, destined to live as a ‘Chosen 
People’ in the ‘Promised Land,’ had to live dispersed among the 
peoples in a form of passive globalization.
If Christianity is a globalizing religion intending to spread over 
the whole earth, it is nonetheless about a reign which is not of ‘this 
world.’ The Augustinian distinction between the City of God and 
the City of Man is constitutive of Christian thought and practice, 
although it had often been deliberately blurred. Mission does not 
necessarily mean subjugation, though in history both quite often went 
together. Islam, however, does not know of such restrictions. The 
pagans are neither excluded nor violently ‘missionized,’ but subju- 
gated and converted. Here, the distinction reads Dar el Islam and 
Dar el Harb: “house of Islam” and “house of war”. This means exacdy: 
‘where there is no Islam, there is war.’ And since war is not a desir- 
able state, the rule is: ‘where there is war, shall be Islam.’ For this 
reason, Islam is the most pronouncedly globalizing religion among 
the three Abrahamitic monotheisms. The globalizing element of 
monotheism is present only in a passive form in Judaism, in the 
form of diaspora; it becomes active in Christianity, but tempered by 
a that-worldly orientation; and finds its intemperate political expres- 
sion only in Islam.
The globalizing dynamics of monotheism is based from in its 
underlying universalism. If there is only one god, He is responsible 
for all countries and peoples. Polytheism expresses the diversity and 
plurality of the world, monotheism knows of only one god, one world 
and one humanity. For this reason, the Bible interprets the diver- 
sity of languages as a punishment and a ‘depravation of creation.’ 
The plurality of peoples, goyim in Hebrew, acquires the negative 
meaning of ‘pagans,’ and in the Arab expression dar el-harb, this neg- 
ative meaning becomes most manifest. The three monotheisms han- 
dle their universalistic perspective, however, in very different manner. 
Judaism postpones it to a ‘messianic age.’ History is determined by 
the plurality of the nations and religions. Only at the end of time, 
in the post-histoire of messianic time, will the peoples convert to the 
One God and go to Zion for worship.
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For Christianity, the Messiah has already come, bringing, how- 
ever, not the end of history; the end will come only when the gospel 
has been told to all the peoples. Until then, the kingdom of God is 
in a certain mysterious way present, it is ‘true,’ but not of this world. 
At least the shi’ite Islam knows of this messianic-eschatological post- 
ponement, but not of the Christian dichotomy of the two kingdoms. 
Islam insists on realization, that is, on transformation of religion into 
politics here and now; it leaves no doubt that its kingdom is of this 
world. Of the three Abrahamitic religions, it is the one that is most 
resolute in the realization of the political implications of monotheis- 
tic universalism.
This most unequivocally and politically globalizing religion sees 
itself now confronted with a similarly globalizing movement, not in 
Christianity, but in the shapc of post-Christian secularism, which 
shares with Christianity its universalistic impulse but not its spiritual 
perspective and which, for the same reason, globalizes the world in 
such a successful and even irresistible way that it can only be per- 
ceived by Islam as a mortal threat. With Western secularism on the 
one side and Islam on the other, we have two religions which oper- 
ate on the political plane with the claim to universal power, and 
which demonize each other as mortal enemies. In this extreme sta- 
tus, however, this analysis holds true only for the two extreme spear- 
heads of tliese two powcrs, Islamism and fundamentalism on the one 
liand and the Bush administration as the exponent ol Western val- 
ues or value-fundamentalism (democracy, individualism, market econ- 
omy etc.) on the other. This offers to the more moderate zones 
within and between the two blocks, to liberal Islam and to plural- 
istic Europc with its partly Islamic history, the chance of playing the 
role of the third and of brcaking up the dangerous dualism.
Is it possible or even probable that the radical polarization of the 
world is connected with the Mosaic distinction between true and 
false rrligion? I would think so, but its destructive potential is only 
realized in a modern, post-monotheistic world. In this situation, the 
only cure seems to consist in a resolute de-demonization of the other. 
The West should beware of demonizing Islam by confounding it 
witli Islamism (and then depicting it as the ‘personification of its own 
question’). Islam is a complcx and pluralistic phenomenon. The West 
should support the libcral, refornrist trends as opposed to the fun- 
damentalists and puritans (the Wahhabites) with their radical fanati- 
cism. Of crucial import is also the disentanglement of politics and
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religion. Western secularism must not see and advertise itself as the 
only true and universal form of political order. Islam or Islamism, 
in turn, should no longer insist on the immediate political realiza- 
tion of its religious norms and notions.
Monotheistic religion must remember its original critical impulse. 
It was originally intended as a means of breaking up the insepara- 
ble unity of ‘rule’ and ‘salvation,’ LHerrschaft, und LHeil,' typical of the 
representative theocracies of the Eastern empires, Babylonia, Assyria, 
Egypt, Persia and Hcllenism ruled by gods and the sons of Gods. 
The idea of the ‘covenant’ burst the compact unity of rule and sal- 
vation and withdrew salvation from the hand of the rulers. Monothe- 
ism originally meant political criticism. Biblical monotheism opposed 
the pharaonic oppression with its utopia of a decent society, where 
nobody was enslaved or humiliated. Monotheism meant the dehni- 
tion of an Archimedean point, from which to unhinge the political 
orders of the ancient world. This issue may be defined as the sep- 
aration of religion and politics. This separation is given up where 
religion foregoes its critical potential and establishes a new form of 
totalitarian unity, forcing politics, jurisprudence, art and other cul- 
tural fields under its vision.
The political theology of the Pentateuch and the prophets has a 
double direction. It is not only about founding and legitimating a 
new form of political order, but it is also and primarily about criti- 
cizing and delegitimizing the traditional prevailing order; and this, not the 
foundational function, is the most important aspect of biblical polit- 
ical theology. Biblical monotheism as it appears in the Books of 
Exodus and Deuteronomy is a weapon directed against the political 
structures of the Ancient Near East. However, if we continue read- 
ing in the Hebrew Bible beyond the Pentateuch, from the Books of 
Judges and Samuel to the Books of Kings and further through the 
Books of the Prophets, it becomes crystal clear that biblical political 
theology is not so much directed against Egypt and Babylonia, but 
it rather addresses Israel’s own society. Egypt and Babylonia are just 
symbols for what is considered to be wrong in terms of political 
order. Moses standing before Pharaoh is just a model for the later 
prophets to confront their respective kings in Jerusalem, Samaria and 
Babylon. Biblical Monotheism constructs a new platform from which 
to criticize and delegitimize polidcal order. This platform simply did 
not exist in the pre-Israelite world. Religion was part of the system.
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Now, it became a system of its own, separated from culture includ- 
ing politics, economics, arts and sciences.
Yet, the function of biblical political theology is, both, critical and 
foundadonal; it delegitimizes the previous political order and legit- 
imizes a new one. It separates religion from the rest of culture, but 
it tends to transform the whole of culture in the light of truth. It 
differendates and it de-differentiates. As a means of differentiation, 
it represents an immense achievement in the history of mankind, in 
terms of freedom and human rights against the claims of politics; as 
a power of de-differentiation, however, of totalitarian ‘Gleichschaltung’ 
(ideological standardization and synchronisationi) of culture under the dic- 
tate of religion, it is a danger to human freedom.
For a close, I would like to summarize my interpretation of mono- 
theism as being (originally) a political movement of resistance and 
liberation in dve points, which correspond to dve leitmotifs in the 
Biblical narrative:
(1) The motif of liberation. The liberadon from Egypdan serfdom is 
the drst and foremost foundation of the new religion; it is thus purely 
political, meant to found human society on a new basis which for- 
ever precludes oppression, exploitation and humiliation.
(2) The motif of God’s oneness, uniqueness or solitude. As we have 
seen, this has also, at lcast originally, a political meaning. Political 
alliances are exclusive: you must serve two overlords. A small state 
such as Israel was constantly confronted with the decision of whethcr 
to side either with Egypt or Assyria, but never with both. 1 he only 
way to escape these constraints was to form an equally exclusive 
alliance with God that excluded other gods and othcr lords. The 
resoludon to recognize only one God is, by its origin, a purcly polit- 
ical intention.
(3) The motif of God as legislator. A legislating god was unknown to 
the world of.polytheism. God as judge, to be sure, was a central 
concept in Egypt and Mesopotamia, but legislation was the task of 
the king. The idca of justice was divine, but the formulation and 
promulgation of concrete laws to be derived from the idea of jus- 
tice was the task of the king, because the laws were deemcd to be 
dependcnt on historically changing situations. The legislating god 
replaces the king in his most important function.
(4) The motif of the wrath of God. The jealousy and the wrath of 
God are political affects, distinguishing the sovereign ruler. The
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biblical god develops these qualities only after the formation of the 
covenant at Mt. Sinai. Unlike the gods of Egypt and Mesopotamia, 
YHWH does not rule over other gods, but over human people, and 
assumes the necessary political emotions in relation to his people.
(5) The prohibition of images. Many things arouse the anger of God, 
but he reacts most furiously to images. The primal scene of the 
wrath of God is the story of the Golden Calf, which God resents 
as defection to other gods. What is wrong with images? Images are 
the medium through which the gods of ancient polytheisms exerted 
their rulership on earth. The ancient oriental state may be classified 
as a ‘representative theocracy.’ The states were ruled by state-gods, 
Assur in Assyria, Marduk in Babylonia, Amun-Re in Egypt, yet they 
ruled not directly but indirectly, through representatives such as the 
king, the sacred animals and the innumerable images in the tem- 
ples. Mundane government is just a replica and representation of 
divine rulership, and draws its legitimacy from this ‘theo-mimesis.’ 
This sphere of representation is destroyed by the prohibition of 
images. The god of Israel rules directly, not indirectly. Every image 
would destroy the immediacy of His presence. The covenant is based 
on direct theocracy. In this context, I would also like to refer to 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt’s remark on Augustine’s rejection of any rep- 
resentation of the city of God on earth. According to Eisenstadt’s 
understanding of Augustine’s position, people could not ‘represent’ 
the City of God without conceiving themselves as divine. In this 
rejection of representation, Eisenstadt detected what he called an 
“Axial theme,” a feature of “axiality.” Axial Age civilizations develop 
a strong aversion to representing the divine, because it implies the 
danger of self-deification. There is first a Jewish, then a protestant 
reserve against political institutions representing the divine on earth, 
such as les rois thaumaturges in France and also some elements of sacral 
kingship in pre-reformation England. This is the political meaning 
of idolatry; and, in my view, it belongs to the original semantic core 
of monotheism.
References
Agus, Aharon (1988). The Binding of Isaac and Messiah. Albany, NY: University of 
New York Press.
Assmann, Jan (1996). “The Mosaic Distinction: Israel, Egypt, and the Invention of 
Paganism.” In: Represenlations 56: 48 67.
MONOTHEISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSE£UENCES 159
—. (1997). Moses the Egyptian. The Memoiy of Egypt in Westem Monotheism. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
—. (2003). Die Mosaische Unlerscheidung oder der Preis des Monotheismus. Munich: 
Hanser.
Gellner, Ernest (1994). Encounters with JVationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gentile, Emilio (2000). “The Sacralization of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations 
and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism.” In: 
Totalitarian Alovements and Political Religions 1, 1: 34-55.
Meddeb, Abdelwahab (2002). La maladie de llslam. Paris. Seuil.
